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____________________________________________________________________________________________ any issues of contrast and transformation even arise.
After all, silence is not really an absence in any simple sense at all-rather it is a marker for an absence-it is what is left that tells you that there is an absence. But a marker is itself a presence, so that silence paradoxically brings this absence into presence. Of course, this cannot actually be done in any stable or complete sense, so that comprehending silence amounts to the incompletable process of grasping something indefinite, or infinite. Silence in itself is telling us something about the kinds of relationships with nature, or God, that Coleridge wants to mark out.
Telling of silence is paradoxical too, just as the word 'silence' carries a paradoxical meaning. One obvious response is to say that the sea tells us of silence by being audible at a distance-showing us the silence of the local environment by contradistinction. 7 This is fair enough, but it seems to miss the tensions that underlie the poem, and that are so often played out elsewhere. Aside from anything else it misses the symbolic significance of the sea. The sea tells us of silence because the two are symbolically linked-the waves with their 'stilly murmur' are transient forms produced by enigmatic forces working in the silence of the deep. Waves and their murmur peter out and flow back into the silence of which the sea is made metaphorically.
The sound qualities of the lines are crucial to the meaning of the whole poem because the word 'silence' is transformed by the patterning of 's' sounds into an onomatopoeic resonance that becomes a structuring reference point: This is rather striking since it is now the sound qualities of the poetry that are telling us of silence-bringing the sense of the words 'Sea' and 'Silence' into play in spite of their absence. It also provokes an implicit comparison between the images of the sea and the harp, and in spite of the obvious similarity and association between the two images there is a crucial difference, ____________________________________________________________________________________________ because waves are part of the sea, and silence for them is a returning to unity. Neither the harps themselves, nor the tunes produced by them are part of the intellectual breeze-for them silence amounts to extinction.
The struck-out passage in draft 2 of the Rugby manuscript shows Coleridge wrestling with this relationship in greater detail, and he says that the harp's tunes There is a great tangle of struck out words and phrases here-'Organiz'd Body' is replaced with 'Mechaniz'd Matter'-what may be 'Instruments' is heavily struck out, and the line ended with 'Harps'-'Organic' is added above 'Instruments' to give 'Organic Harps' and further strikeouts smother the lines. The entire passage is repeated afresh, but with less certainty-now God 'would be' the universal soul, the 'Concert' has become a 'concént' and is 'vast' rather than 'Harmonious', and there is a new tangle between 'Matter Mechaniz'd', and 'Mechaniz'd Matter'. The grammar of the line ruptures as 'Mechaniz'd' hovers between adjective and verb-God may not be doing the organizing or mechanizing any more, and the causal connection to the harps is hanging in the balance. This connection is crucial, and resurfaces in another draft where the breeze 'sweeps the Instruments, it erst had's passage fram'd' (PW II 1 324).
It is hard to make much clear sense out of this tangle, except to observe that the focus of the lines, and of their torturous revisions seems to fall on the relationship between the tunes and God-they are the terms that are being rehashed, and there is now a 'great Harmonious Concert' in which the tunes participate. It is an interesting attempt to double up on the sense of belonging to the infinite-by making the tunes belong to the both the breeze and the concert, but in the end the problem is still the same-silence involves dropping out of existence.
The Eolian Harp has been connected to a wide range of specific philosophical formulations-arguments have been made in favour of Schelling, Böhme, Plotinus, Hartley, Priestley, Berkeley, and Cudworth. If we look in the obvious places in Coleridge's reading it is not difficult to find plenty of material that shows how questions like this came to be formulated. Priestley himself sets the problem in Matter and Spirit for example:
Nor, indeed, is making the Deity to be, as well as to do every thing, in this sense, any thing like the opinion of Spinoza; because I suppose a source of infinite power, and superior intelligence, from which all inferior beings are derived; that every inferior intelligent being has a consciousness distinct from that of the Supreme Intelligence… Coleridge was not convinced by Priestley's attempt to stave off the consequences of monistic thought, and remains uncertain. It is this uncertainty that the poem enacts 12 -Coleridge was not drawing on a particular 'source', rather he was constructing a deliberately generalizing speculation that dramatizes the metaphysical tensions working in his mind. 13 However, his use of the image is actually even more widely scattered than this suggests-he discusses it in a marginal note on Kant, where he dismisses the conception of the mind as an Eolian harp (M III 247-8), and in a note on Platner discussing Kant (M IV 124). It appears again in marginal notes on Böhme (M I 609) and Heinroth (M II 1003), and in a Notebook entry on Steffens (CN V 6683) . Similarly, he uses the related sea imagery in a marginal note on Jacobi, saying: 'He seems always to have the Image of an Ocean before him, surging itself into forms. The begetting, the creating, these are above him' (M III 100). The harp image also turns up elsewhere, often performing the function of testing or problematizing the conceptions he is reading or thinking about. The doctrine of the Trinity… rests securely on the position-that in Man omni actioni praeit sua propria passio; Deus autem est actus purissimus, sine ullâ potentialitate-. As the Tune produced between the Breeze & the Eolian Harp is not a self-subsistent, so neither Memory or Understanding or even Love in Man: for he is a passive as well as active Being… But in God this is not so-(CM V 25-6) This is particularly interesting because it describes a much clearer and more sophisticated pantheism than can be derived directly from the poem, and once more it emphasizes the problematic status of the finite individual. It also demonstrates the breadth of the image's application for Coleridge, as he uses it here as an explication of a Trinitarian account of Deity.
I want to suggest that what is most important in The Eolian Harp is the connection that is made between the absolute, with the threat it poses to the status of the finite, and the clash between reason and faith. 15 This connection represents the starting point of a philosophical problematic that governs much of Coleridge's later thought and his attempts to negotiate the relations between reason and faith in his dealings with idealism and pantheism.
The poem ends with the ironic scene of his wife chiding him for being led astray by his speculations and telling him to 'walk humbly' with his God-this ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________ is an image of the conflict between reason and faith. It is in the pantheism controversy itself that this conceptual connection is pushed to its crisis, with Jacobi's arguments that all consistent use of speculative reason results in fatalism and atheism-in the swallowing up of the individual in an absolute that leaves no room for faith.
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Jacobi therefore argues for the rejection of reason, and as part of this general strategy he depicts Lessing as a thinker led astray (into Spinozism) by his rational speculation. Jacobi presents himself as a contrast to Lessing's Spinozism, emphasizing the need for a salto mortale, a leap of faith, and ends the book demanding humble faith and obedience to an incomprehensible God, just as Sara does: This is the Majesty of the Lord, the Countenance of God, to which mortal eye cannot reach. But in his goodness He descends to us, and through his grace the Eternal One becomes a presence to man, and He speaks to him… I fall silent, I fall prostrate glowing with thanks and delight.-In shame lest I could still be asking for a better way to knowledge and peace… 17 This pietistic 'shame' and disavowal of thought in the face of a super-rational Deity parallels the poem's self-judgment: 'For never guiltless may I speak of Him, / Th' INCOMPREHENSIBLE! save when with awe / I praise him, and with Faith that inly feels'. 18 It seems natural to suggest that the resemblance between the conversation between Sara and the poet and the infamous conversation between Jacobi and Lessing is more than co-incidence. There is even a striking resemblance between some of the details of the two conversations:
Whenever Lessing wanted to represent a personal Divinity, he thought of it as the soul of the All; and he thought the Whole after the analogy of an organic body. Hence, as soul, the soul of this Whole would be only an effect, like any other soul in all conceivable systems. Its organic compass, however, cannot be thought after the analogy of the organic parts of this compass, inasmuch as there is nothing 16 For an overview of the controversy itself see Frederick Beiser, The image of the organic compass is reminiscent of an Eolian harp-a mechanical toy driven into action by mysterious external forces. Earlier in their discussions, Lessing and Jacobi had discussed Leibniz's comparison of human freewill to the needle of a compass that thinks it points to the north of its own volition. Jacobi argued (and they agree) that this is essentially similar to Spinoza's image of a stone that has been thrown and believes it is continuing its motion by freewill. 20 Most startling though is Lessing's description of God as 'the soul of the All' ('Seele des Alls'), which is reminiscent of Coleridge's 'Soul of each and God of all'. Indeed, the phrase clearly caught Coleridge's attention, because he made a fascinating marginal note on this passage in Jacobi, claiming that this idea of 'the soul of the All' had been adopted by Schelling (M III 82).
Coleridge's reading of Jacobi can be confirmed by April 1799, which is about three years after the poem, but there is reason to think he may have known something about the pantheism controversy before this. 21 A contextual study by Schrickx aimed at exploring the question turns up a surprising wealth of references to Jacobi, Mendelssohn (Jacobi's opponent in the dispute) and Lessing in British reviews and periodical articles in the 1790s. 22 Coleridge also made mention of both Lavater and Böhme in the Gutch Memorandum Book which helps to demonstrate his awareness of German thought (CN I 174, 287). This is confirmed by Coleridge's letters in 1796 which include references to Kant and Schiller, a significant mention of Mendelssohn, and most importantly a description of Lessing as 'the most formidable infidel' (CL I 197, 209, 279, 284 ). This last is especially interesting, since Lessing's reputation as an infidel was primarily the result of Jacobi's revelation of his Spinozism, so it seems unlikely that Coleridge could be aware of this reputation without knowing something about the events. This amounts to a substantial case for Coleridge's general knowledge of the controversy as early as 1795-6, when he was writing and revising the first versions of the poem.
My point though is not that Jacobi was the specific source here, but that
